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HARDLY ROOM FOR HARDSHIP—A FUNCTIONAL REVIEW OF 
ARTICLE 79 OF THE CISG 
David Kuster* & Camilla Baasch Andersen** 
INTRODUCTION† 
Over a decade ago, Francesco Mazzotta penned a penetrating article on the issue 
of determination of interest rate under Article 78 of the Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),1 which pierced academic discussions 
at the time, and won a much deserved Schmitthoff research award. It was 
appropriately entitled: “CISG Article 78: Endless disagreement among 
commentators, much less among the courts.”2 After finding a similar phenomenon 
of “much ado about nothing,” in relation to the application of Article 79 and the 
issue of hardship, the authors were inspired to undertake a similar debunking of 
a similar myth, in Mazzotta’s vein. We hope it may inspire others to pursue 
pragmatic and empirical research issues. 
* David Kuster is a student at the University of Melbourne studying the Juris Doctor and previously
completed a Bachelor of Philosophy with honours at the University of Western Australia. 
** Dr. Camilla Baasch Andersen is Professor of International Commercial Law at University of 
Western Australia, and has worked as a CISG specialist for two decades at universities across several 
continents. For a full bio see: http://www.web.uwa.edu.au/people/camilla.andersen. 
† The Journal of Law and Commerce adheres to The Bluebook Uniform System of Citation, but 
citations to foreign authority in this Article instead follow a system of citation employed by the author 
that is used in other jurisdictions in discussion of the subject matter addressed. With respect to foreign 
language sources for which the Journal of Law and Commerce was not provided an English translation, 
the editors have relied on the author for the veracity of statements drawn from such sources. 
1 U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods [CISG], opened for signature 
Apr. 10, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983); Annex I, U.N. DOC.A/Conf. 97/18 (1980). 
2 Francesco G. Mazzotta, CISG Article 78: Endless Disagreement Among Commentators, Much 
Less Among the Courts, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 
123–61 (Pace Int’l L. Rev. ed., 2004). 
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The question of whether Article 79(1) CISG can form a basis for 
exemption from liability in cases where hardship occurs is one that has 
divided CISG scholars.3 There is no mention of the term “hardship” within 
Article 79(1), and the linguistic problem of categorizing hardship as an 
“impediment” rather than a “difficulty” has fueled the debate. However, as 
Schwenzer points out, unforeseeable changes in circumstances that alter the 
economic equilibrium of a contract (i.e., situations of hardship) are one of the 
major problems parties to a contract face in international commercial law4—
and so this is an area that needs clarification. 
From Schlechtriem to Honnold to The Practitioners Guide to the CISG, 
innumerable academics have extended their analysis of the provision and 
expressed their various views on whether or not liability for failure to fulfill 
an obligation can or should be exempted under Article 79 CISG in cases of 
hardship. A few years ago, the CISG Advisory Council (“CISG AC”) sought 
to offer clarity on this topic through its AC Opinion No. 7 of October 2007, 
stating that: 
A change of circumstance that could not reasonably be expected to have been 
taken into account, rendering performance excessively onerous, may qualify as an 
“impediment” under article 79(1). . . . Therefore, a party that finds itself in a 
situation of hardship may invoke hardship as an exemption from liability under 
article 79.5  
This seems to allow this inclusion of hardship considerations in the ambit of 
Art 79(1). However, the discussion and debate surrounding the provision has 
not subsided as a result of this opinion. As Professor Flechtner eloquently 
3 This Article applies the definition of “hardship” as found in Article 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT 
principles: “There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the 
contract either because the cost of the party’s performance has increased or because the value of the 
performance a party receives has diminished.” INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE L. 
[UNIDROIT], Principles of International Commercial Contracts, art. 6.2.2, http://www.unidroit.org/ 
instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles-2010/403-chapter-6-performance-section-2-
hardship/1058-article-6-2-2-definition-of-hardship. 
4 Ingeborg Schwenzer, Force Majeure and Hardship in International Sales Contracts, 39 VICT. U. 
WELLINGTON L. REV. 709, 709 (2009). 
5 CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, ¶ 3.1, Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG, 
Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University School of Law, New York, N.Y., USA. 
Adopted by the CISG-AC at its 11th meeting in Wuhan, People’s Republic of China, on 12 October 2007. 
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states, Article 79(1) is “difficult to understand, challenging to distinguish, 
and daunting to apply.”6 
This Article argues that while the varying scholarly and theoretical 
contributions to the issue over the years have been very informative (and an 
interesting study for the comparative lawyer), they are ultimately not 
important now that there is a sufficiently large body of case law on the issue 
to illustrate a functional uniformity. It is not the scholars who shape the future 
of the CISG, but the judges and arbitrators who apply it. And they have 
spoken. 
This Article thus demonstrates that Courts and arbitral tribunals have set 
the threshold for exemption for hardship very high due to the risks inherent 
in international commercial trade, and that there are no currently recorded 
decisions exempting a party from liability due to hardship using Article 79(1) 
of the CISG. With a practical threshold so high as to make application of 
Article 79(1) closely align with impossibility, the functional outcome of the 
application is that hardship is in fact not covered by Article 79 CISG. 
Due to this high threshold, parties entering into a contract governed by 
the CISG, who wish to be protected from hardship, would be well advised to 
draft a clause in the contract ensuring this. The CISG will not grant it for 
them, regardless of what the CISG AC and other scholars assure us. 
A. The Academic Debate
Article 79(1) of the CISG provides:
A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that
the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of
the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its
consequence.
It is evident that there is no mention of “hardship” or economic difficulty
in this provision. The use of the word “impediment” leaves significant room 
6 Harry M. Flechtner, The Exemption Provisions of the Sales Convention, Including Comments on 
“Hardship” Doctrine and the 19 June 2009 Decision of the Belgian Cassation Court, 3 BELGRADE L. 
REV. 84, 85 (2010). 
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for interpretation.7 Thus, legal commentators have been attempting to 
interpret this “vague and imprecise”8 wording in order to determine whether 
it incorporates situations of hardship or economic duress. 
Most scholars support a broader interpretation of Article 79(1), in line 
with the CISG AC Opinion No.7, including “changes in circumstances” 
within the meaning of “impediment” and thus including situations where the 
economic circumstances have made performance excessively onerous.9 
Scholars such as Professor Bonell rely on the wording of the article to reach 
a conclusion, surmising that the use of the words “impediment” and “could 
not reasonably be expected . . . to have avoided or overcome it or its 
consequences,” show that changes in circumstances short of impossibility 
can be unreasonable to enforce and thus hardship is included within the 
wording.10 
On the other hand, some legal commentators point towards the nature 
of risk inherent within international commercial sales11 and argue that 
nothing short of “impossibility” satisfies the wording of Article 79(1), thus 
excluding hardship from the scope.12 Others have even advocated that there 
be a duty to renegotiate the contract in extreme events where an unreasonable 
increase in costs of performance has occurred, based on the concept of good 
faith found in Article 7(1) of the Convention.13 This is arguably an extreme 
position, especially for those of us trained in a pacta sunt servanda point of 
view. 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 See, e.g., Rolf Kofod, Hardship in International Sales, CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles (2011) 
(thesis, University of Copenhagen-Faculty of Law), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kofod.html. 
8 Joern Rimke, Force Majeure and Hardship: Application in International Trade Practice with 
Specific Regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, in 
REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 197, 218 
(PACE INT’L L. REV. eds., 1999–2000). 
9 See, e.g., Joseph Lookofsky, Not Running Wild with the CISG, 29 J.L. & COM. 141, 157–58 
(2009); Rimke, supra note 8, at 214; Schwenzer, supra note 4, at 711. 
10 Michael J. Bonell, Force Majeure e Hardship Nel Diritto Uniforme Della Vendita 
Internazionale, in DIRITTOD DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 570 (1990) (It.). 
11 Elena C. Zaccaria, The Effects of Changed Circumstances in International Commercial Trade, 9 
INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 135, 136 (2004). 
12 See Flechtner, supra note 6, at 92–93; Sarah H. Jenkins, Exemption for Nonperformance: UCC, 
CISG, UNIDROIT Principles—A Comparative Assessment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2015, 2024 (1998). 
13 Hans Stoll & Georg Gruber, Article 79, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 600, 618 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas trans., 2d 
ed. 1998). 
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Another argument again is the travaux preparatoires argument, which 
is popular amongst those arguing for the exclusion of hardship from the scope 
of Article 79(1)—they point out that at the Vienna Conference, the question 
of whether economic difficulty should give rise to an exemption of liability 
was discussed at length and ultimately rejected.14 This is a very valid point. 
The Norwegian delegation proposed that paragraph 3 of Article 65 of the 
1978 UNCITRAL Draft Convention ought to state that, “. . . nevertheless, 
the party who fails to perform is permanently exempted to the extent that, 
after the impediment is removed, the circumstances are so radically changed 
that it would be manifestly unreasonable to hold him liable.”15 This proposed 
Article would govern situations of hardship, as it deals with the changing of 
circumstances that would make it excessively arduous for a party to perform. 
However, this proposal was ultimately rejected and the wording of Article 
79(1) was settled upon.16 So, when weighing the intention of the drafters, 
hardship should be excluded. 
Moreover, in the UNCITRAL outline of coded issues for all CISG 
Articles,17 it is interesting to note that there is not a specific code for issues 
of economic impediment or hardship. There is a code for “Types of 
impediments” (79B2) and one for “General elements for excusing” (79B1), 
but nothing specifically on the issue of economic duress in a contract.18 
The 2012 UNCITRAL case law digest on Article 79 also clearly 
dismisses the notion of any case law permitting hardship as an exemption of 
liability, reflecting the same position as the previous Digest published in 
2008.19 
That is not to say that the CISG should not be subject to a dynamic 
interpretation.20 We need not necessarily be religiously bound by travauxs if 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 Schwenzer, supra note 4, at 712. 
15 U.N. CISG, 27th mtg. at 381, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.97/C.1/L.191/Rev.1 (Mar. 28, 1980). 
16 Ibid. at 382. 
17 UNCITRAL Outline of the CISG [The UNCITRAL Thesaurus], U.N. DOC. A/CN.9/SER.C/ 
GUIDE/1 (Sept. 12, 1995). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Sale of Goods, 2012 UNCITRAL DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, ch. V, § IV at 390; Sale of Goods, 2008 
UNCITRAL DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, ch. V, § IV at 254. 
20 See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 
(1998). 
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courts and tribunals are moving away from an expressed intention of the 
drafters, in a unified manner. As times change, instruments like the CISG, 
which are unlikely to be re-drafted, need to retain some dynamic elasticity. 
However, there has been no indication that courts or tribunals are departing 
from the original intention in the outcomes of cases reported. In the very few 
cases where hardship is applied, it is done so under otherwise applicable rules 
of law.21 
Those CISG scholars who seek a comparative law solution point to the 
nature of the CISG, which seeks a compromise between civil and common 
law, as the reason for this confusion and, as such, indicate that there is little 
chance of clarity coming from within the text of the Convention, as any 
express clause including or excluding hardship might be seen as leaning too 
far towards either civil or common law. As such, there is still no agreement 
amongst scholars concerning hardship and Article 79(1). 
However, an examination of the CISG cases involving claims of 
hardship show that there is a functional uniformity present and that certainty 
for contracting parties may be gleaned from the court’s approach to Article 
79(1), rendering the academic debate just that: academic. This is largely due 
to the almost unattainable threshold the courts set for a hardship exemption 
due to the inherent risk of international commercial trade. 
In order to understand the increased threshold present for international 
commercial trade, this article will first examine the domestic thresholds for 
jurisdictions, which contain hardship exemptions. 
B. Defining Functional Uniformity—A Standard of Applied Uniformity 
Uniform laws such as the CISG operate with their own unique 
methodologies and—in some cases—pathologies. The distinction between 
the semblance of uniformity and actual applied uniformity has long been 
appreciated.22 
In that vein, the inability of Article 79(1) to be uniformly interpreted at 
a scholarly level may well be a symptom of a problem of uniform application. 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 See discussion of Scafom International v. Lorraine Tubes S.A.S., infra. 
22 Camilla Baasch Andersen, A New Challenge for Commercial Practitioners: Making the Most of 
Shared Laws and Their ‘Jurisconsultorium’, 38 U.N.S.W. L.J. 911, 922–23 (2015) [hereinafter Andersen, 
A New Challenge for Commercial Practitioners]. See also Camilla Baasch Andersen, Defining Uniformity 
in Law, 12 UNIF. L. REV. 5, 29 (2007) [hereinafter Andersen, Defining Uniformity]. 
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In fact, that could easily be expected. But in this particular case, an outcome 
based—or functional—methodology will reveal a different story. 
This Article operates with the concept of “functional uniformity” as an 
expression of a unique standard of applied uniformity. In some cases, the 
application of a rule may not be uniform in process or appearance, but in 
taking a strictly functional approach based on outcome, we can operate with 
a functional standard of uniformity: Courts and Tribunals may be operating 
with very different parameters in applying a rule, but they can achieve 
outcomes which are so similar as to be uniform in function.23 
C. Some Key Domestic Thresholds for Hardship Exemptions 
Many civil law countries, such as Germany,24 Netherlands,25 Italy,26 
Greece,27 Portugal,28Austria29 and the Scandinavian countries,30 incorporate 
notions of hardship or similar exemption doctrines in their domestic laws 
and/or civil codes. In contrast, common law is notoriously unsophisticated in 
its development of similar concepts of hardship. In his 1996 analysis of the 
Italian onerosità and common law “hardship,” Perillo states that “. . . the 
common law has no developed doctrine of dissolving or adapting a contract 
because of hardship.”31 
However, even though the threshold that individual jurisdictions have 
in place for hardship exemptions are on average lower than those set for 
international commercial trade, even domestic courts applying their own 
hardship rules are hesitant to grant an exemption of liability due to economic 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 Camilla Baasch Andersen, Applied Uniformity of a Uniform Commercial Law: Ensuring 
Functional Harmonisation of Uniform Texts Through a Global Jurisconsultorium of the CISG, in THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF HARMONISATION 30, 32 (Mads Andenas & Camilla Baasch Andersen eds., 2012). 
24 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 313 (Ger.). 
25 Art. 6:258, para. 1 BW. (Neth.). 
26 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1467 (It.). 
27 ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] 388 (Greece). 
28 CC art. 437 (Port.). 
29 ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] §§ 936; 1052; 1170a 
(Austria). 
30 See Ole Lando, CISG and Its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some International Principles of 
Contract Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 397 (2005). 
31 Joseph M. Perillo, Hardship and its Impact on Contractual Obligations: A Comparative Analysis, 
CENTRO DI STUDI E RICERCHE DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E STRANIERO, SAGGI, CONFERENZE E SEMINARI 
(Apr. 1996), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/perillo4.html. 
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circumstances making performance excessively burdensome. There are 
examples of Italian cases setting quite low thresholds, but these are few and 
far between.32 
One example of this is found in United States law, which accepts the 
principle of “commercial impracticability”33 through which a party may be 
exempted if, as a result of unexpected supervening events, such as a steep 
increase in prices, performance becomes severely more burdensome.34 
However, the American court in In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium 
Contracts Litigation35 noted that, “promisors seeking to establish 
impracticability by reason of increased expense have not generally found a 
sympathetic ear in court.”36 In Maple Farms,37 one of the leading cases on 
commercial impracticability, the supplier experienced a sudden 23% increase 
in the price of raw milk in a short period of time due to supervening events 
including inflation, unanticipated crop failures and government reforms. As 
such, the supplier asked to be relieved of the contract due to commercial 
impracticability (hardship). However, the court refused to exempt the 
supplier from performing the contract, stipulating that the price increase 
could not be deemed as unexpected. In the American cases in which courts 
have found commercial impracticability, price changes were “especially 
severe and unreasonable,”38 and there are no cases where something less than 
a 100% cost increase has been held to make a seller’s performance 
impracticable.39 
A similarly high threshold is found in the UK, where The Tsakiroglou, 
a 1962 case, is yet to be overturned on the doctrine of frustration.40 In this 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 One example is given by Perillo, supra note 31, at 12, who states that “an arbitral decision has 
held that a 14% devaluation of the English pound sterling was a sufficient ground for the adaptation of a 
contract. . . .” under domestic Italian law. 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). 
34 CHRISTOPH BRUNNER, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER GENERAL CONTRACT 
PRINCIPLES: EXEMPTION FOR NON-PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 431 (2009). 
35 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
36 Ibid. at 453 (citing Maple Farms, Inc. v. City Sch. Dist. of City of Elmira, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Com., 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 
U.S. 1062 (1978); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966)). 
37 Maple Farms, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 786. 
38 Gulf Oil, 563 F.2d at 600. 
39 Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 UCC Rep. Serv. 989, 992–93 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 
1975). 
40 Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl GmbH [1962] AC 93 (Eng.). 
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case, a carrier was found to be obligated to transport goods from Sudan to 
Hamburg despite the unexpected closure of the Suez Canal, which made the 
journey economically unviable. 
Indeed, this seems to be the norm for most reviewed domestic principles 
of hardship. In 2009, Christoph Brunner conducted an exhaustive 
comparative analysis of a significant number of domestic principles of 
hardship and stipulated that, as a rule of thumb, there seems to be a 100% 
minimum threshold present.41 This is a significant threshold and one that is 
hard to attain, especially as the courts take the price volatility of a product 
into consideration. However, as demonstrated with the United States 
examples above, there are some domestic cases where parties have been 
exempt from liability, or the court has amended the contract, due to hardship. 
Another example of this is found in Germany, where economic hardship 
is recognized by the principle of “Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage,”42 which 
was codified in 2002 through paragraph 313 of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
The German principle allows a judge to adapt the contract in cases of 
hardship and the threshold for this is lower than in other jurisdictions, which 
has seen parties successfully argue on the grounds of hardship.43 
Overall, however, it must be said that the threshold for hardship in 
domestic jurisdictions is significantly high, making it difficult for parties to 
be exempted from liability on the grounds of hardship. 
When examining cases in international commercial law, it is evident that 
the threshold is even substantially higher, thus making a hardship exemption 
almost impossible and therefore providing certainty and functional 
uniformity. 
D. International Threshold for Hardship 
The inherent risks and price fluctuations that are part and parcel of 
international commercial trade means that courts are unwilling to grant 
exemption of liability due to hardship. The fact that “in an international 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 BRUNNER, supra note 34, at 431. 
42 Ibid. at 405. 
43 Ibid. at 405–07; Andreas Heldrich, Vertragsanpassung bei Störung der Geschäftgrundlage—
Eine Skizze der Auspruchslosung des Paragraph 313 BGB, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ANDREAS HELDRICH 
ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 183, 189 (Stephan Lorenz et al. eds., 2005). 
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market, one may expect the potentially aggrieved party to insist on 
incorporating terms for possible adjustment in the contract or otherwise 
assuming the risk for higher fluctuations than usually occur on domestic 
markets,”44 means that unforeseen price fluctuations are almost impossible 
and thus, so too is exemption from liability due to hardship. As one legal 
commentator noted, “the risk of hardship is virtually inevitable in the field of 
international trade, as the economic and political context is subject to 
continual flux and rapid change.”45 
An examination of the approach of international arbitrators gives an 
insight into this, as arbitrators are extremely hesitant to intervene in cases of 
hardship in international commerce. In general, arbitrators feel that such 
changes in circumstances are not unforeseeable or should not exempt liability 
as the parties assume a certain amount of risk if they fail to include a hardship 
clause. For example, in International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Award 
No. 1512, the arbitrator commented that as a rule, one should be very 
reluctant to exempt a party from liability in situations of hardship and stated 
that, “caution is especially called for in international transactions where it is 
generally much less likely that the parties have been unaware of the risk of a 
remote contingency or unable to formulate it precisely.”46 Similarly, in ICC 
Award No. 8873, the arbitrator held that adaptation of the contract, or 
exemption of liability cannot be enforced unless specifically included in the 
contract between the parties.47 
The tribunals will generally feel that, in international commerce, the 
price is subject to constant change and the parties accept that risk. As such, 
in ICC Award No. 8486, in which a Dutch manufacturer and a Turkish buyer 
contracted for the sale of a manufacturing plant, severe exchange rate 
fluctuations meant that there was a dramatic drop in the price of the relevant 
product on the Turkish market, and thus the buyer argued that he be exempted 
of liability due to hardship. The tribunal stated that, “in international 
commerce one must rather assume in principle that the parties take the risk 
                                                                                                                           
 
44 MARTIN DAVIES & DAVID V. SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN GOODS: GLOBAL 
SALES IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 334 (2014). 
45 Zaccaria, supra note 11, at 136. 
46 ICC Award No. 1512 of 1971, SIGVARD JARVIN & YVES DERAINS, COLLECTION OF ICC 
ARBITAL AWARDS 3 (1990); see also Zaccaria, supra note 11, at 159–60. 
47 ICC Award No. 8873 of 1997, 10 BULLETIN DE LA COUR INTERNATIONAL D’ARBITRAGE DE LA 
CCI 81 (1999); see also Zaccaria, supra note 11, at 160. 
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of performing and carrying out the contract upon themselves, unless a 
different allocation of risk is expressly provided for in the contract.”48 The 
fact is, international trade inevitably bears risks. 
For example, Ecuador suffered a steep devaluation of its currency in 
1999, which saw the exchange rate fall to 25,000 Sucres for one U.S. Dollar 
in early 2000, with a devaluation of 67%.49 As such, any international 
contracts entered into before 1999, without a hardship clause and 
denominated in Sucres, were suddenly worth 67% less.50 Even though this 
distorts the equilibrium of the contract, such are the risks that one bears 
regularly when dealing in international commerce and should be taken into 
account. Large currency and price fluctuations are not unforeseeable and as 
international commercial trade has professional participants, it is expected 
that the parties will protect themselves against such situations through a 
hardship clause in the contract or a forward contract. Thus parties are 
arguably not going to be exempted of liability due to hardship in the 
international commercial sale of goods. 
E. Functional Uniformity of Article 79(1) 
Although there is debate between scholars about whether Article 79(1) 
encompasses situations of hardship, the fact remains that there is functional 
uniformity on the matter, with the courts consistently refusing to exempt 
parties from liability due to hardship under Article 79(1), as the threshold 
that the courts hold for international commercial contracts is such that the 
fluctuations of price have never been deemed drastic enough. 
Although some courts and tribunals have been willing to accept that 
hardship exists within the wording of Article 79(1), up until now there has 
not been a single reported court or arbitral decision that has exempted a party 
from liability under a CISG sales contract due to hardship.51 As such, there 
is functional uniformity. Thus far, there have only been sixteen reported cases 
in which a party has sought an exemption from a CISG sales contract due to 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 ICC Award No. 8486 of 1996, 1999 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 162 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.). 
49 PAUL BECKERMAN & ANDRES SOLIMANO, CRISIS AND DOLLARIZATION IN ECUADOR: 
STABILITY, GROWTH, AND SOCIAL EQUITY 7 (2002). 
50 Ibid. 
51 DAVIES & SNYDER, supra note 44, at 334. 
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hardship under Article 79, compared to the sixty-one cases that have been 
heard pursuant to Article 79.52 This may serve as an indication that parties 
are already aware that they are very unlikely to be exempted from liability 
under Article 79(1) when arguing hardship. 
The court’s stance on hardship under Article 79(1) was demonstrated in 
the 2006 Sunflower seed case, in which the seller sought to be exempted from 
liability under Article 79(1), arguing that a steep reduction in production, 
availability of the product and increased transportation cost had made 
delivery of the product excessively onerous and costly.53 However, the court 
stated its view that the CISG does not release a party from liability based 
upon a change of the economic background on which the parties relied, and 
dismissed the claim quickly.54 Similarly, in the Canned oranges case, a 
Chinese arbitral tribunal dismissed a seller’s claim for losses to be divided 
due to unforeseen factors transpiring after the contract was concluded, such 
as the weather, the sudden increase in price of oranges, the operation of the 
market economy, the cost of the can material and sugar increasing 
substantially and the foreign exchange rate fluctuating wildly, all causing a 
drastic change in the overall economic situation.55 The court again refused to 
sustain the request and dismissed the claim for hardship under Article 79(1).56 
This is similar to the decision reached in Societe AG v. SARL Behr 
France,57 in which the buyer sought to rely on Article 79 due to the collapse 
of the automotive market, and in particular, of industrial vehicles, making the 
ultimate customer change its buying conditions and impose a price that was 
less than half the price of the goods supplied by the seller.58 Again the court 
demonstrated the functional uniformity present in all the CISG cases 
concerning hardship and dismissed the claim, stating that “it was up to the 
defendant, a professional experienced in international market practice, to lay 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, supra note 5. 
53 Efetio Lamias, Greece, 2006 (Sunflower seed case) (docket No. 63/2006), English editorial 
analysis available on the Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060001gr.html. 
54 Ibid. 
55 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), China, May 2006 
(Canned oranges case), English translation available on the Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
060500c1.html. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Cour d’appel Colmar, France, 12 June 2001 (Societé AG v. SARL Behr France), English 
translation available on the Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010612f1.html. 
58 Ibid. 
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down guarantees of performance of obligations to the plaintiff or to stipulate 
arrangements for revising those obligations, as it failed to do so, it has to bear 
the risk associated with noncompliance.”59 
As international commercial trade is filled with professional market 
participants, the courts are not sympathetic to price fluctuations and 
economic changes, as they are arguably part of the risks of the world of 
international commercial sales. Although the courts are reluctant to address 
whether theoretically and in principle a claim for a hardship exemption under 
Article 79(1) could be sustained, they provide certainty through uniform 
decisions that all dismiss the possibility of a party being exempt from liability 
due to hardship. Even when price fluctuations have far exceeded Brunner’s 
100% “domestic threshold” as outlined above, and are arguably so drastic 
that they could be reasonably seen as unforeseeable, the courts are still 
unwilling to exempt a party from liability due to hardship. 
For instance in the Iron molybdenum case, the price of the product had 
increased by 300% and the court still dismissed the claim, arguing also that 
the product was prone to significant price fluctuations as a speculative 
commodity.60 Given that this was a German case, a jurisdiction which does 
allow hardship exemptions through “Weggfall der geshaeftsgrundlage,” it 
provides a good example of a higher international threshold. 
Despite what some may say, it seems that all courts have held the line 
consistently when it comes to hardship and Article 79(1), consistently 
refusing to exempt parties from liability even when the economic 
circumstances change significantly and perhaps even unforeseeably.61 In 
some of the cases where courts have addressed the issue of hardship, they 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 Claude Witz, UNCITRAL Case Abstract, Societé AG v. SARL Behr France, INT’L INST. FOR 
COM. L., English translation available on the Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010612f1.html. 
60 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Germany, 28 February 1997 (Iron molybdenum case), English 
translation available on the Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970228g1.html. 
61 See, e.g., Tribunale Civile di Monza, Italy, 14 January 1993 (Nuova Fucinati v. Fondmetall 
International), English translation available on the Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
930114i3.html; Oberlandesgericht Brandenburg, Germany, 18 November 2008 (Beer case), English 
translation available on the Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/081118g1.html; Rechtbank van 
Koophandel Ieper, Belgium, 18 February 2002 (L. v SA C.), English translation available on the Internet 
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020218b1.html; ICC Arbitration Case No. 6281, 26 August 1989 
(Steel bars case), English translation available on the Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
896281i1.html; CIETAC, China, 2 May 1996 (“FeMo” alloy case), English translation available on the 
Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960502c1.html. 
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have stated that situations of hardship could be potentially seen as an 
“impediment” under Article 79(1).62 This is irrelevant, however, as in 
practice they refuse to exempt a party from liability due to hardship under 
Article 79(1). Thus this functional uniformity provides parties with clarity 
and certainty concerning hardship and Article 79(1), and should advise them 
to ensure their contract covers such scenarios. 
Some commentators point towards the 2009 Scafom case,63 to indicate 
that the courts have in fact exempted a party from liability due to hardship, 
as the court adapted the contract and ordered the parties to renegotiate due to 
a 70% price increase of the product (steel tubes).64 However, the court of 
appeals in the Scafom case did not arrive at its ruling using Article 79(1) of 
the CISG, rather it agreed with the previous instance that hardship was not 
governed by Article 79(1) CISG.65 It went on to use Article 7(2) to fill in 
what it determined to be a gap, meaning that it decided the issue using 
otherwise applicable law.66 By turning to Article 7(2), the court thus 
unequivocally places the issue of hardship outside the scope of the CISG and 
Article 79(1). It is an odd application of legal reasoning that then decides to 
look for a solution elsewhere, after deciding that the applicable law does not 
support the claim. The second instance had applied the general principle of 
good faith as understood by French law, which allows the court to adapt the 
contract and order the parties to renegotiate contractual terms.67 The third 
instance makes the same mistake of thinking that the omission of hardship is 
a gap, but uses the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts to fill the gap instead. 
Both solutions are symptomatic of a “homeward trend,” as the judge 
failed to understand the true international character of the CISG and sought 
                                                                                                                           
 
62 Hof van Cassatie, Belgium, 19 June 2009 (Scafom case), English translation available on the 
Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090619b1.html. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See, for example, Professor Sieg Eiselen’s commentary to the case online, where he alludes that 
the case follows the CISG-AC Opinion 7 guidelines. Siegfired Eiselen, UNCITRAL Editoral Remarks, 
Scafom case, INT’L INST. COM. L., English translation available on the Internet at http://www.cisg.law 
.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/090619b1.html. 
65 Hof van Cassatie, Belgium, 19 June 2009 (Scafom case), English translation available on the 
Internet at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090619b1.html. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Kelda Groves, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Four Legal Systems, 15 CONSTRUCTION L.J. 265, 
271 (1999). 
2016] A FUNCTIONAL REVIEW OF ARTICLE 79 OF THE CISG 15 
 
Vol. 35, No. 1 (2016) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2016.116 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
to embellish the applicable law with a domestic principle of hardship. As 
Professor Flechtner states, the decision of the judge in the Scafom case 
“distorts the meaning of the CISG, violates the mandate to interpret the 
Convention with regard for its international character and threatens the 
political legitimacy of the treaty.”68 Clearly the judge misinterpreted Article 
79(1) by classifying the omission of hardship as a gap, when, as Schwenzer 
stated, “. . . there is no gap in the CISG regarding the debtor’s invocation of 
economic impossibility and the adaption of the contract to changed 
circumstances. If one were to hold otherwise, unification of the law of sales 
would be undermined. . . .”69 The identification of this alleged gap is a point 
of much criticism performing a “rather perverse tour de force”70 to arrive at 
a decision to support the use of the civil law remedy of contractual adjustment 
by the court. Nevertheless, in regard to the objective of this article, ultimately 
the court in Scafom did not exempt the party due to hardship using Article 
79(1), but—despite obvious inclinations in favor of hardship evidenced by 
their “tour de force”—even they cannot extend Article 79(1) to include 
hardship. And so, the case falls within the consistent lines of the functional 
application of Article 79(1) applied in this Article. 
When there is vagueness within an international instrument such as the 
CISG, it is not uncommon to see instances of “homeward trend,”71 where 
judges are tempted to use different approaches in order to interpret Article 
79(1) such as in Nuova Fucinati v. Fondmettal International,72 where the 
judge equated Article 79(1) of the CISG to Article 1467 of the Italian Civil 
Code,73 which only provides release and excuse from a duty made 
“impossible” by a supervening impediment. 
However despite alarming evidence of homeward trend, and differences 
in approach to the question, the bottom line is uniform application. The courts 
remain clearly unified in terms of outcome when applying Article 79(1) of 
the CISG in situations of hardship, as there has not been a single decision 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 Flechtner, supra note 6, at 83. 
69 Schwenzer, supra note 4, at 713. 
70 Flechtner, supra note 6, at 87. 
71 For more on the homeward trend application of shared laws, see Andersen, Defining Uniformity, 
supra note 22, and more recently, Anderson, A New Challenge for Commercial Practitioners, supra note 
22. 
72 Tribunale Civile di Monza, Italy, 14 January 1993, English translation available on the Internet 
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930114i3.html. 
73 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1467 (It.). 
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where the courts have exempted a party to a CISG contract from liability due 
to hardship under Article 79(1). They have continually denied hardship under 
the CISG, or set an artificially high threshold that is effectively unattainable, 
thus virtually ruling out hardship as an exemption in international 
commercial trade under the CISG. 
The Empirical Data 
The below table illustrates this. Amongst the reported Article 79 cases 
which deal with hardship, set out below, none have found that Article 79 can 
extend to encompass the concept; either because the threshold is too high or 
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Based on the above data, the authors maintain that there is functional 
uniformity of Article 79 when it comes to hardship. The cases above may 
apply very different reasoning in not applying Article 79 to cases involving 
hardship; but the end result is the same. Whether from a refusal to extend 
Article 79 to hardship, or from applying an impossibly high threshold, it is 
clear that the case law has spoken: Article 79 does not apply to hardship. 
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CONCLUSION 
As mentioned, there have been numerous articles written by scholars 
surrounding the issue of whether Article 79(1) includes situations of 
hardship.74 The CISG Advisory Council’s 2007 No. 7 Opinion failed to bring 
closure to the debate, as scholars and commentators continue to disagree on 
whether in principle an economic change in situation after the conclusion of 
the contract may qualify as an “impediment” as per Article 79(1). 
However, such debate is superfluous, as an examination of all the cases 
concerning the exemption of a party from liability due to hardship under 
Article 79(1) gives a clear picture of functional uniformity in application. 
Although the courts do not expressly or uniformly pronounce on whether 
Article 79(1) should govern situations of hardship, the ones that might 
entertain the notion set thresholds for such an exemption which are 
effectively unattainable. Thus, in practice, this means parties can be certain 
that they will not be exempt from liability due to hardship under the CISG. 
Even in cases where the economic and financial circumstances have changed 
so significantly that it can well be argued that it could constitute an 
unforeseen impediment, the courts have nonetheless refused to exempt 
parties from liability under Article 79 and depart from contractus qui habent 
tractum succesivum et dependiam de futuro rebus sic stantibus inteliguntu, 
abandon the general principle of pacta sunt servanda,75 or (wrongly) apply 
otherwise applicable law/legal principles to the issue. 
As such, the functional uniformity present in the court and arbitral 
rulings means that there should be no confusion when it comes to hardship 
and the CISG, as the courts have made their stance clear. In negotiating a 
commercial contract under the CISG, parties who wish for there to be a 
hardship exemption are thus uniformly advised to include such a clause in 
the contract. Article 6 ensures that any clear contract clause implemented in 
to a contract will take precedence over Article 79 in the question of 
exemption from liability. So if parties want hardship to apply, they had best 
                                                                                                                           
 
74 See Flechtner, supra note 6; Catherine Kessedijan, Competing Approaches to Force Majeure and 
Hardship, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 415 (2005); Kofod, supra note 7; Peter Mazzacano, Force Majeure, 
Impossibility, Frustration & the Like: Excuses for the Non-Performance: The Historical Origins and 
Development of an Autonomous Commercial Norm in the CISG, 2 NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 53 (2011); 
Schwenzer, supra note 4, at 709; Zaccaria, supra note 11, at 135. 
75 Kessedijan, supra note 74, at 427. 
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make sure the contract mandates it. Indeed, neither the CISG nor relying on 
gap-filling will yield a predictable outcome. 
